Ebola in the United States

Four people have ever been diagnosed with Ebola on U.S. soil, all in 2014; eleven were treated here and two died. No case from the 2026 DRC Bundibugyo virus outbreak has reached the United States, and CDC rates the risk to the general public as low. This page gives the complete case history as CDC records it, CDC's published reasoning for the 2026 assessment, the entry rules now in force, and what CDC does not publish.

Sources: CDC (pages dated September 8–14, 2026), CDC MMWR, WHO Disease Outbreak News, NEJM. Last reviewed: September 14, 2026.

Current Risk Assessment

CDC Risk Assessment — updated September 8, 2026: CDC "continues to assess the risk to the general U.S. population as low." No Ebola cases associated with the outbreak have been reported in the United States (CDC situation summary, September 14, 2026). The outbreak is concentrated in eastern DRC — Ituri accounts for about 80% of cases — with Uganda's linked outbreak over. Two U.S. citizens who were infected while working in DRC were medically evacuated to Germany, in May and July 2026, and both recovered (WHO DON 603, 613, 617). Since May 2026 travelers who have been in DRC within 21 days cannot board commercial flights to the U.S.

Check the CDC Situation Summary →
Correction, published September 14, 2026. Until this update the page said one U.S. aid worker infected in DRC had been evacuated to Germany. WHO reported a second U.S. citizen — a humanitarian worker — evacuated to Germany on July 13, 2026, and had done so before this page's previous review date. Both patients were treated in Germany and are counted among DRC's cases, not America's. Logged on our corrections page.

How CDC Reached "Low" — the Published Reasoning

The assessment is not a slogan; it is a method with three parts, published in CDC's MMWR on June 11, 2026 (Richard et al.). CDC scored the likelihood of infection in the general U.S. population over the following three months as extremely low, the impact of any infection as high (because of the resources a single case consumes), and combined them into an overall risk of low, with moderate confidence. The stated limitations were "uncertainties around the epidemiology of BVD as well as the current and future scope and geographic spread of the outbreak." The same issue carried CDC's scenario model (Mooring et al.): with only 20% of patients isolated, a 65% chance the outbreak would exceed 20,000 cases within three months; with 70% isolated, a one-in-twenty chance of reaching 10,000.

What happened next is checkable. Three months after those scenarios were published, DRC had reported roughly 6,600 confirmed cases (6,342 at day 112 and 6,942 at day 119 of CDC's own chart data, i.e. September 2–9) — below the poor-isolation scenario's 20,000 and below the 10,000 threshold, though CDC's September operational review still described the outbreak as expanding uncontrolled (CDC MMWR 2026;75(35):554). The domestic assessment has not changed: CDC's risk page was reviewed June 17 and updated September 8, 2026, and still reads "low."

Two facts explain why the U.S. number stays at zero while the DRC number passes 7,000. First, people are not infectious before symptoms (CDC; WHO), so an infected traveler who is well on boarding cannot infect fellow passengers — in 2014, after exit screening began, "no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel" (CDC MMWR 2014;63:1163). Second, the 2026 rules do not screen DRC travelers; they exclude them for 21 days, the full incubation period.

Who Is at Elevated Risk in the U.S.

While the general public faces low risk, the following groups warrant heightened awareness:

  • Travelers who were in DRC within the past 21 days — particularly anyone with exposure to sick individuals, healthcare settings, or deceased persons in Ituri, North Kivu, Haut-Uélé, Tshopo, Bas-Uélé or South Kivu
  • Healthcare workers treating patients with recent travel to outbreak-affected regions who present with compatible symptoms
  • Laboratory workers handling specimens from patients with possible viral hemorrhagic fever
  • Humanitarian aid workers and journalists who have been operating in the outbreak zone

If you fall into any of these categories and develop fever, headache, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, or unexplained bleeding within 21 days of returning, isolate yourself and call your healthcare provider before going to a clinic. Inform them of your travel history immediately.

History of Ebola Cases in the United States

All confirmed Ebola cases treated in the United States occurred during the 2014–16 West Africa epidemic. No other outbreak has resulted in U.S. cases. CDC's outbreak history records the U.S. entry as "4 cases, 1 death (25%)" — the four diagnosed on U.S. soil — and separately notes that "11 people were treated for Ebola virus infection in the U.S., two of whom died."

2014–2016: The West Africa Epidemic Response

During the largest Ebola outbreak in history, 11 people were treated for Ebola in the United States. Seven were medically evacuated after infection in West Africa; four were diagnosed in the United States — one traveler from Liberia, two nurses infected caring for him, and one physician who fell ill after returning from Guinea. Until September 25, 2014, every Ebola patient in the country had been diagnosed abroad and flown in for care (CDC MMWR 2014;63:1087).

First U.S. diagnosis Thomas Eric Duncan — diagnosed at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, Dallas, September 30, 2014. Duncan had traveled from Liberia to visit family. He died October 8, 2014 — the first Ebola death on U.S. soil.
Healthcare worker cases Nurses Nina Pham and Amber Vinson contracted Ebola while caring for Mr. Duncan at Texas Presbyterian. Both were transferred to specialized centers and recovered fully.
Medical volunteers Dr. Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol (Samaritan's Purse) contracted Ebola in Liberia and were airlifted to Emory University Hospital, Atlanta — the first patients treated for Ebola in the U.S. Both survived. Dr. Brantly received the experimental antibody treatment ZMapp and, earlier in Liberia, a blood transfusion from a young Ebola survivor he had treated.
New York City case Dr. Craig Spencer (Doctors Without Borders) was diagnosed in New York City after returning from Guinea in October 2014. He was treated at Bellevue Hospital Center and survived. The case triggered implementation of a 21-day voluntary quarantine protocol for returning healthcare workers in New York and New Jersey.
Total U.S. deaths 2 — Thomas Eric Duncan (Dallas) and Dr. Martin Salia (Nebraska Medical Center, November 2014). All other U.S.-treated patients survived.

What Treatment in a U.S. or European Hospital Achieved — the 27-Patient Series

The outcomes of every laboratory-confirmed Ebola patient cared for in the United States and Europe from August 2014 through December 2015 were pooled by Uyeki et al. (NEJM 2016;374:636). There were 27 patients, median age 36; 22 (81%) were healthcare personnel; 24 had been infected in West Africa and three (the two Dallas nurses and a Spanish nurse) acquired the infection in the U.S. or Europe. Nearly all received intravenous fluids and electrolyte replacement; 9 (33%) needed mechanical ventilation, 5 (19%) needed dialysis-type renal replacement, and 23 (85%) received investigational therapies. Five died — a mortality of 18.5% — against roughly 70% among patients with known outcomes in West Africa at the time (WHO Ebola Response Team, NEJM 2014). The authors attribute the difference to intensive supportive care: fluids, electrolyte correction, nutrition, and critical care for respiratory and renal failure. It is the strongest evidence that Ebola's fatality rate is a function of the care available, not only of the virus — and it is the reason the 2026 gap between Uganda's 10% and DRC's 48% is plausible rather than surprising (see symptoms).

How the 2014 Screening System Performed — the Numbers

  • Exit screening: from August to November 10, 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers departed Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone by air, about 12,000 of them en route to the United States. Boarding was denied to ill travelers and to those reporting high-risk exposure, and no traveler was reported symptomatic with Ebola in flight after the procedures began (CDC MMWR 2014;63:1163).
  • Entry screening and active monitoring: from October 2014 all travelers from affected countries were funneled to five U.S. airports and monitored for 21 days. Georgia alone monitored 1,070 travelers through March 31, 2015; 30 required medical evaluation and three were tested for Ebola — none positive (CDC MMWR 2015;64:347).
  • Military deployment: about 2,500 U.S. service members deployed to Liberia were monitored twice daily and for 21 days after return; 32 developed a fever during deployment and none had Ebola (CDC MMWR 2015;64:690).

Those figures are the empirical basis for the 2026 assessment. In the largest epidemic ever, with tens of thousands of arrivals monitored, the United States recorded four diagnoses and one imported case that transmitted.

The 1989 Reston Incident

Reston virus was discovered in macaques imported from the Philippines to a primate-holding facility in Reston, Virginia in 1989 — and, per CDC, to facilities in Philadelphia and Alice, Texas. Four people developed antibodies but never experienced symptoms; a further Texas episode in 1996 infected no one. Reston virus is the one orthoebolavirus known not to cause illness in people. It was the first Ebola virus identified outside Africa and was dramatized in Richard Preston's book The Hot Zone.

U.S. Preparedness Infrastructure

The U.S. response to the 2014–16 epidemic revealed critical gaps that drove the development of a more robust national preparedness system.

🏥 Special Pathogen Treatment Centers

The National Special Pathogen System of Care was built for HHS's Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response by NETEC, a partnership of Emory University, the University of Nebraska Medical Center and NYC Health + Hospitals/Bellevue. Its regional treatment centers have:

  • Purpose-built negative-pressure isolation rooms
  • Trained teams with regular Ebola PPE drills
  • Dedicated waste management protocols
  • 24/7 on-call Ebola response teams

The 2014–15 patients were treated at Emory University Hospital (Atlanta), Nebraska Medical Center (Omaha), the NIH Clinical Center (Bethesda), and Bellevue Hospital (New York City). CDC's Viral Special Pathogens Branch takes clinical consultations around the clock through the Emergency Operations Center.

✈️ Entry Restrictions and Screening — 2026 Rules

Under CDC's order under 42 CFR 71.40 (CDC returning-traveler page, September 11, 2026):

  • DRC: anyone who has been in DRC within 21 days — including U.S. citizens and passengers who only transited a DRC airport — cannot board a commercial flight to the U.S. and must wait out 21 days abroad
  • Uganda or South Sudan (not DRC): U.S. citizens and nationals are routed to Washington-Dulles, Atlanta or New York-JFK for entry screening — a questionnaire, temperature check, observation by CDC staff, and enrolment in 21 days of automated text-message symptom reminders; some other travelers from these countries are restricted
  • Travelers whose last day in any of the three countries was more than 21 days ago are not screened

CDC operates Port Health stations at 20 U.S. ports of entry and land-border crossings.

📋 Reporting & Coordination

If a U.S. healthcare provider suspects Ebola in a patient:

  • Contact your state or local health department immediately
  • Call the CDC Emergency Operations Center: (770) 488-7100 (24/7)
  • The state health department coordinates specimen collection, testing authorization, and patient transport to a designated treatment center if needed
  • Ebola is a nationally notifiable disease — all suspected cases must be reported

What CDC Does Not Publish — and How to Read "Low"

  • A running count of Americans under monitoring. In 2014–15 state health departments published monitoring totals; for 2026, CDC's pages describe the monitoring process but do not give a national count of travelers enrolled (checked September 14, 2026). We do not know how many people are currently in the 21-day window.
  • How many suspected cases have been tested in the U.S. CDC says its Laboratory Response Network is ready and that its consult team is available 24/7, but no tally of 2026 evaluations or tests has been published. In 2014–15, Georgia alone evaluated 30 travelers and tested three.
  • Americans infected abroad. The two U.S. citizens treated in Germany appear in WHO's reports as part of DRC's count; CDC's U.S. tally excludes them because they were neither diagnosed nor treated in the United States. Both conventions are correct; they answer different questions.

"Low" is a statement about likelihood in the general population, not about what would happen to a person who was infected — CDC scores that impact as high. It is also a three-month assessment that CDC re-issues; the September 8 update kept it unchanged. Compared to what? For Ebola's U.S. exposure and death rates alongside 14 other viruses — most of which cause more American deaths every week than Ebola has in history — see the Virus Risk Perspective and this site's Ebola risk perspective.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is there Ebola in the United States right now?

No. As of September 14, 2026, CDC states that no Ebola cases associated with the 2026 DRC Bundibugyo virus outbreak have been reported in the United States, and its risk assessment (updated September 8) rates the risk to the general U.S. population as low. Two U.S. citizens infected while working in DRC were evacuated to Germany, not the U.S. (WHO DON 603 and 613). Travelers who have been in DRC within 21 days cannot board commercial flights to the U.S.

How many Americans have gotten Ebola?

Per CDC, 11 people were treated for Ebola in the United States during the 2014–16 epidemic; four were diagnosed on U.S. soil and two died: Thomas Eric Duncan and Dr. Martin Salia. All other U.S.-treated patients — including nurses Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, Dr. Kent Brantly, Nancy Writebol, and Dr. Craig Spencer — survived. No other outbreak has resulted in U.S. cases.

Which U.S. hospitals can treat Ebola?

The National Special Pathogen System of Care, created for HHS's ASPR by NETEC (Emory, the University of Nebraska Medical Center and NYC Health + Hospitals/Bellevue), designates regional treatment centers with specialized isolation units and trained staff; the 2014–15 patients were treated at Emory, Nebraska, the NIH Clinical Center and Bellevue. If Ebola is suspected, do not self-transport to any hospital — contact your state health department or the CDC EOC at (770) 488-7100 first.

Does the U.S. have airport screening for Ebola?

Yes — and in 2026 travelers from DRC are excluded for 21 days rather than screened. Those arriving from Uganda or South Sudan are routed through Washington-Dulles, Atlanta or New York-JFK for a questionnaire, temperature check, observation and 21 days of text-message monitoring (CDC, September 11, 2026). In 2014, roughly 80,000 travelers were exit-screened in West Africa, about 12,000 of them bound for the U.S. (CDC MMWR). All travelers returning from outbreak-affected areas should self-monitor for 21 days and call before seeking in-person care if symptoms develop.

Sources & References

  1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Ebola Outbreak: Current Situation. Page dated September 14, 2026. cdc.gov/ebola/situation-summary
  2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics. Risk to the U.S. Population from the 2026 Ebola Disease Outbreak Caused by Bundibugyo Virus. Published June 17, updated September 8, 2026. cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/…/bvd2026-assessment
  3. Richard DM, et al. Assessment of Risk to the U.S. Population from the Ebola Disease Outbreak Caused by Bundibugyo Virus, 2026. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2026;75(22):290–292. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7522e2
  4. Mooring EQ, et al. Modeled Scenario Projections for the Ebola Disease Outbreak Caused by Bundibugyo Virus, 2026. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2026;75(22):285–289. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7522e1
  5. Kabasele D, et al. Notes from the Field: Characteristics and Monitoring of the 2026 Outbreak of Ebola Disease Caused by Bundibugyo Virus — DRC, August 2026. MMWR 2026;75(35):554–556. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7535e1
  6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Information for Travelers Returning from Ebola-Affected Areas. Page dated September 11, 2026. cdc.gov/ebola/situation-summary/returning-travelers
  7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. History of Ebola Outbreaks (United States entry, 2014). Reviewed May 29, 2026. cdc.gov/ebola/outbreaks
  8. Chevalier MS, et al. Ebola virus disease cluster in the United States — Dallas County, Texas, 2014. MMWR 2014;63(46):1087–8. PMID 25412069
  9. Uyeki TM, et al. Clinical Management of Ebola Virus Disease in the United States and Europe. N Engl J Med 2016;374:636–46. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa1504874
  10. Brown CM, et al. Airport exit and entry screening for Ebola — August–November 10, 2014. MMWR 2014;63(49):1163–7. PMID 25503920
  11. Parham M, et al. Ebola active monitoring system for travelers returning from West Africa — Georgia, 2014–2015. MMWR 2015;64(13):347–50. PMID 25856255
  12. Cardile AP, et al. Monitoring Exposure to Ebola and Health of U.S. Military Personnel Deployed in Support of Ebola Control Efforts — Liberia, 2014–2015. MMWR 2015;64(25):690–4. PMID 26135589
  13. World Health Organization. Disease Outbreak News 603 (May 22), 613 (July 17) and 617 (September 10, 2026): Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus. who.int/…/2026-DON617
  14. NETEC — National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center. About NETEC. netec.org/about-netec
  15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Port Health. cdc.gov/port-health